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Transatlantic Influences on American
Corporate Jurisprudence: Theorizing the
Corporation in the United States
TARA HELFMAN*
ABSTRACT

In interpretingand evaluating the history of the Supreme Court's
corporate jurisprudence, legal scholars have deployed three broad
theories of corporate legal personality: the aggregate entity theory, the
artificialentity theory, and the real entity theory. While these theories are
powerful ways of conceptualizing the corporation,this article shows that
they have not been as central to the Supreme Court's corporate
jurisprudence as recent scholarship suggests. It instead argues that
historic transformations in the high court's corporatejurisprudenceare
best understood in light of contemporary intellectual currents rather
than through an expost facto applicationof the aggregate,artificial,and
real entity theories. This article revisits the Supreme Court's early
corporatejurisprudence,focusing on the Court's reception of English and
continental theories of corporation during the antebellum period. It
argues that the Marshall Court's approach to corporate legal personality
was deeply reliant on early modern English precedents, which were
preoccupied with the nature of the corporation as a locus of political
authority bounded by constitutionalconstraints.It further suggests that
the Taney Court's transformative decision in Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston Railroad v. Letson (1844)-that a corporation is a citizen of
the United States-was directly influenced by the writings of the German
jurist Friedrich von Savigny. Here, the article bridges a significant gap
in the history of American legal thought by illustrating the role that
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Attorney General Hugh Legar4 played in presenting to the court a
compelling and novel synthesis of English precedent and contemporary
continental theory. The articleconcludes by considering the long shadow
these rulings have cast on recent Supreme Court decisions regardingthe
rights of corporationsas citizens of the United States.
INTRODUCTION

When U.S. courts have been called on to adjudicate the rights of
corporations, they have frequently had to consider the very nature of
corporate personhood. A living, breathing, palpitating individual has
rights to life, liberty, and property, but does an incorporeal legal fiction
enjoy those same rights? A natural person has a right to the free
exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution,1 but does a corporation? Even if we agree that
corporations possess these rights, how do we ascertain their scope? In
addressing these questions, the federal judiciary has considered the
degree to which corporations have an existence separate from that of
their shareholders. Corporations, like individuals, can sue and be sued;
they can enter contracts and breach them; they can own, acquire, and
convey property; and they can be held liable for civil damages. 2 But
unlike individuals, corporations can survive indefinitely and they can
enjoy certain legal immunities, like tax exemptions, that individuals do
not.3 Both individuals and corporations are volitional beings, but
characterizing the nature of the corporation has in many ways proven
as contentious an enterprise as characterizing human nature itself.
Looking back through nearly two hundred years of precedent,
scholars have identified three distinct theories underlying the federal
judiciary's approach to the nature of corporate legal personality: the
aggregate entity theory, the artificial entity theory, and the real entity

1. "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the free exercise [of religion]." U.S
CONST. AMEND. I.
2. In these respects corporations are very much Maitland's "right-and-duty-bearing
unit[s]." FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, Moral Personalityand Legal Personality,in 3 THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 304, 307 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
3. JAMES D. Cox & THOMAs LEE HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
PRELIMINARY MATERIALS § 1:5 (2015) (discussing benefits of incorporation, generally); 1
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 6 (rev. vol., 2015) (perpetuity of corporations); Cox & HAZEN, supra note 3, at § 1:2
(perpetuity of corporations); id. at § 1:10 (tax considerations); 14 FLETCHER ET AL., §
6952.50 (tax considerations); 10 FLETCHER ET AL., § 4942 (criminal liability); COX & HAZEN,
supra note 3, at § 8:21 (criminal liability).
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theory. 4 Under the aggregate entity theory, the corporation is merely
the sum of its parts, an assemblage of the rights of its individual
shareholders. Under the artificial entity theory, the corporation is more
than the sum of its parts: the corporation, as a creature of the law,
5
possesses a distinct personality separate from that of its members.
Finally, under the real entity theory, the corporation is a creation of the
market with a capacity to act that is different in kind from that of its
members.6 But the distinction between these three theories of corporate
personhood is not as tidy in practice as commentators might suggest.
Moreover, these theories are not necessarily an apt way to approach
cases that predate their formulation.
Until recent decades, scholarship on American corporate theory
7
emphasized legal developments during the postbellum period, which
8
witnessed the rapid transformation of the American economy. Alfred D.
4. See, e.g., Jason Iuliano, Do CorporationsHave Religious Beliefs? 90 IND. L.J. 47, 5562 (2015) (surveying the history of the three theories in federal jurisprudence); Darrell
A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U.L. REV. 887, 914-31 (2011) (discussing the manner in
which the three theories of corporate personhood have influenced the constitutional rights
of corporations); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the CorporateForm, 2010 WIS.
L. REV. 999 (tracing the history of the three theories of corporate personality and
discussing the place of Citizens United within them); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraisingthe
Real Entity Theory of the Corporation,21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (1994) (evaluating the
implications and validity of the real entity theory); David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation,1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201 (providing an overview of the theories' development
over the prior hundred and fifty year period).
5. The artificial entity theory of the corporation has also been referred to as the
concession theory of corporate personality. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of
CorporateLegal Personality,35 YALE L.J. 655, 667 (1926) ("Mhe concession theory may
be indifferent as to the question of the reality of a corporate body; what it must insist upon
is that its legal power is derived [from the state].").
6. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 1068 ('Real entity theories differ considerably, but
they all distinguish themselves from the aggregate theory by maintaining that a
corporation is a being with attributes not found among the humans who are its
components. This corporate being, moreover, is a real thing." (citation omitted)); Arthur
Machen, CorporatePersonality,24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 260-61 (1911) ("[I]n recognizing the
existence of a corporation as an entity, the law is merely recognizing an objective fact,
while in refusing to recognize fully the existence of a partnership or voluntary association
as an entity the law is shutting its eyes to facts... A corporation exists as an objectively
real entity, which any well-developed child or normal man must perceive: the law merely
recognizes and gives legal effect to the existence of this entity.")
7. See, e.g., RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW 9-58 (1996); MARTIN SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS (1988); ALFRED
F. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND (1977). For a dated but nevertheless useful survey of

historiography of the period, see Louis Galambos, The Emerging OrganizationalSynthesis
in Modern American History, 44 BUS. HIST. REV. 279 (1970).
8. CHANDLER, supra note 7, at 1.
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Chandler, Jr. mapped this transformation through the changing
organization of the American firm from the 1870s through the early
twentieth century, showing that during this period, vertical integration
and horizontal combination resulted in the rise of large, multiunit
firms.9 Robert H. Wiebe focused on the Progressive Era-what he called
"An Age of Organization"-in demonstrating how a heterogeneous
community of businessmen were instrumental in shaping American
laws governing business enterprises. 10
Scholars such as Herbert Hovenkamp, Naomi Lamoreaux, and
Gregory A. Mark have enriched and expanded the field by exploring
economic and legal developments relating to the corporate form during
the antebellum years. During this period, the corporate form began to
proliferate throughout the young nation, giving rise to questions about
the nature of the corporate charter, the nature of the rights of the
corporate shareholder, and the nature of corporate personality itself."
Mark and Lamoreaux have drawn attention to the states as the central
units of corporate law, policy, and entrepreneurship; 12 Hovenkamp has
shown how classical political economic theory came to dominate state
economic policy and federal and state jurisprudence. 1 3 This article adds
further insight, demonstrating how the Supreme Court's early reception
of English and continental theories of the corporation shaped its
changing views of the nature of corporate legal personality. In
particular, it bridges a significant gap in the history of American
9. Id.; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry,
33 Bus. HIST. REV. 1 (1959) (arguing that while some large-scale mergers were motivated
by market control, many others were prompted by a desire to increase efficiency and
access to materials.); see also NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 (1985); GLENN PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860-

1910 (1973); Lamoreaux, Entrepreneurship in the United States, 1865-1920, in THE
INVENTION OF ENTERPRISE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FROM ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA TO MODERN

TIMES 367 (Landes et al., eds., 2010).
10. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 16-

41 (1962). This economic transformation was accompanied by a legal transformation no
less far-reaching. Gregory Mark has written, "The transformation of the private law of
corporations from 1819 to the 1920s is best described as a move from a circumstance in
which a corporation could do only those things specifically allowed by its charter to one in
which a corporation could do anything not specifically prohibited to it." Gregory A. Mark,
The Personificationof the Business Corporationin American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441,
1455 (1987).
11. Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation: Jurisprudence,Localism, and
Federalism, 10 SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1997).
12. Id. at 412-13.
13. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76
GEO. L.J. 1593, 1597 (1988). For a full discussion of the rise and fall of the classical
corporation, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937

(1991).
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corporate law by explaining how, in the landmark case of Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad v. Letson, the Taney Court came to
overturn decades of federalist jurisprudence and conceive of the
corporation as "capable of 14being treated as a citizen of [the] state, as
much as a natural person."'
For much of its early history, the U.S. Supreme Court closely
followed English precedent in its approach to the rights of corporations.
But during the mid-nineteenth century, the influence of continental
jurisprudence became palpable in the opinions of judges grappling with
the increasingly expansive role of corporations in American life. This
article maps developments in U.S. jurisprudence onto transatlantic
intellectual currents, noting the influence of English and continental
jurists on U.S. law. Part I of this article introduces the historical
foundations of the business corporation in the United States. Part II
demonstrates the manner in which the federal judiciary, under the
leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, carefully followed English
precedent in interpreting the scope of corporate legal personality. In so
doing, it challenges the view that Marshall began his tenure as Chief
Justice as a proponent of the aggregate entity theory of corporate
personality but ended his tenure as a proponent of the artificial entity
theory. 15 Part III discusses the influence of continental theory on U.S.
corporate law at a time when corporations were playing a more varied
role in the American economy than ever before. In particular, it notes
the pivotal role Attorney General Hugh Legar6 played in bringing
continental theory to the attention of the Supreme Court. Part IV
suggests that in many respects the Supreme Court's approach to
corporate legal personality has come full circle over the centuries,
returning to the Marshall Court's understanding of the corporation as
an aggregation of the rights of its shareholders.
This article takes as its methodological foundation the notion that
judicial opinions can be understood not only as authoritative statements
of legal rules but also as expositions of legal theory. Yet that theory is
not pure. It exists not in the lofty philosophical ether but in the judicial
chamber, where it is influenced by the writings of jurists and theorists,
and in the courtroom, where it is inextricably bound up with facts on the
ground. This untidy reality is further complicated by the fact that
common-law judges frequently deploy theories of corporate personality
14. Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844).
15. C.f. Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 1008; Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate "Person"A
New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 61, 69-70 (2005) (arguing that Dartmouth College represents the Court's
abandonment of the aggregate theory of corporate personality for the artificial entity
approach).
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after the fact in order to rationalize decades of precedent. Thus did
Frederick Pollock remark,
English lawyers have never taken dogmatic theories of
any kind much to heart. Our doctrines get settled either
by a gradual process of semi-conscious consent worked
out in the solution of particular cases, or by the
development, in the same manner, of conflicting
tendencies in professional and judicial opinion until at
last a decisive practical choice is called for. 16
The same might be said of American corporate law.
I. WORKS OF PUBLIC UTILITY AND PRIVATE ADVANTAGE: THE EARLY
AMERICAN CORPORATION

The corporate form has played a central role in the economic history
of the United States, not least because it was through corporations that
the American colonies were planted and early American cities took
root.17 Limits on the British crown's ability to rule its colonial subjects
directly made the corporate form an effective structure through which to
assert and organize political power around the globe. By the time the
United States gained its independence, Americans had more than 150
years of experience with municipal, religious, and eleemosynary
corporations. This section offers a critical introduction to the history of
the corporation during the early decades of the Republic, focusing in
particular on the rise of the business corporation in the United States.
In their critique of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens
United 8 , David H. Gans and Douglas T. Kendall argue,
[I]n the Founding era, corporate activities were
significantly limited. Corporations existed only at the
behest of, and by the creation of, the government, to
serve public purposes, such as "supplying transport,
16. Frederick Pollock, Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of
Corporations?,27 L.Q. REV. 219, 219 (1911).
17. I JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE
157-208 (1905). See also PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY
& THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 7-19 (2011);
HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY
OF NEWYORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 13-32 (1983).
18. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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water, insurance, or banking facilities," and had only the
legal rights provided by the government in the corporate
charter. 19
This is only partly correct. Joseph Stancliffe Davis has shown that
of the 317 businesses incorporated during the eighteenth century, 243
provided highway, water, and docking services; sixty-two provided
banking and insurance services; but thirteen were engaged in
20
While it is true that most early
manufacture and other enterprises.
corporations were preoccupied with the transportation and financial
infrastructure of the nation, they were not the only business
corporations around. 21 Furthermore, the small number of corporations
engaged in manufacture is not to be discounted when considered in
context. Between 1783 and 1801, 350 businesses were incorporated in
the United States, a striking contrast to the approximately twelve
corporations chartered in England during the entire eighteenth
22
century.

19. David H. Gans & Douglas T. Kendall, A Capitalist Joker: The Strange Origins,
DisturbingPast, and Uncertain Future of CorporatePersonhood in American Law, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 643, 648 (2011) (internal citation omitted).
20. See JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations in the
United States, in 4 ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 27 tbl.3
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1917). For an example of a business incorporated
for a non-public purpose, see Act for Incorporating Certain Persons by the Name of the
Proprietors of the Beverly Cotton Manufactory, ch. 43, 1788 Mass. Acts 71. It is worth
noting that at least one woman is listed as proprietors of the company. Id.

21. To be sure, the founding generation recognized the utility of the corporate form to
the development of such infrastructure. At the Philadelphia Convention, James Madison
proposed that the Constitution authorize the federal government "[t]o grant charters of

incorporation in cases where the public good may require them, and the authority of a
single state may be incompetent." JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 420 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott, eds., 1920). That language was never

included in the final document, but Madison's proposal reflects the prevailing view of
incorporation as a means of ensuring that private enterprise also serve the public good.
Given the array of businesses incorporated in the early republic, it is evident that the

"public good" was conceived in broad terms.
22. See Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business
Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 3 (1945) ('Throughout the whole of the eighteenth
century England chartered some half-dozen corporations for manufacturing purposes, and
hardly more in any other business sphere. Until well into the nineteenth century the
corporation was used extensively only in the organization of canal companies. Not until
the Companies Act of 1844 did it become common, and full growth awaited the coming of
limited liability after 1855 and the enactment of the Consolidated Statute of 1862."
(internal citation omitted)). John Steele Gordon places the number of businesses

incorporated in the United States in the last four years of the eighteenth century at 335.
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Throughout that century and the early part of the nineteenth,
Americans used the same principal business forms as their English
counterparts:
trusts,
unchartered
joint-stock
companies,
and
partnerships. 23 But in the early years of the Republic, the corporate
form emerged as a device to encourage investment in enterprises
requiring large amounts of capital that government was unable or ill
equipped to provide. Public works were, of course, among these
enterprises, but so were manufacture and industry. In the wake of the
Revolution, the United States struggled to develop domestic
manufacturers that would render the new nation economically as well
as politically independent of Britain. State governments incentivized
entrepreneurs to enter a competitive marketplace by offering bounties
for production. On October 28, 1789, George Washington visited one
such venture, the Boston Sail-Cloth Manufactory, which had been
founded the year before in response to a bounty offered by the
Massachusetts legislature. 24 He made note of what he saw:
Went after an early breakfast to visit the duck [cloth]
Manufacture which appeared to be carrying on with
spirit, and is in a prosperous way. They have
manufactured 32 pieces of Duck of 39 or 40 yds. each in
a week; and expect in a short time to encrease [siclit to [
]. They have 28 looms at work & 14 Girls spinning with
Both hands (the flax being fastened to their waste).
Children (girls) turn the wheels for them, and with this
assistance each spinner can turn out 14 lbs. of thread pr.
day when they stick to it, but as they are pd. by the
piece, or work they do, there is no other restraint upon
them but to come at 8 Oclock [sic] in the Morning and
return at 6 in the evening. They are the daughters of
JOHN STEELE GORDON,

AN EMPIRE

OF WEALTH:

THE EPIC

HISTORY OF AMERICAN

ECONOMIC POWER 228-29 (2004).
23. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 22, at 5-6 (describing American business
methods of organizing and managing capital). For a time, these forms of business proved
sufficient to meet the needs of businesses. State legislatures could confer privileges upon
business associations by special statute. For example, in order to promote iron
manufacture in New York, the state legislature passed a statute in 1786 conferring a
seven-year term of limited liability on the businessmen associated with the Associated
Manufactoring Iron Company of the City and County of New York. See DAVIS, supra note
20, at 260.
24. WILLIAM R. BAGNALL, I THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES 112-17

(1893); Resolve on the Petition of Thomas Walley and Others, Manufacturers of Sailcloth,
Entitling Them to Such Bounty, As Shall Bear the Same Proportion to the Bounty
Expressed in a Resolve of March 1788, 1789 Mass. Acts 333, 333-34 (promising a bounty
of eight shillings for each piece of sailcloth produced in the state).
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decayed families, and are girls of Character-none
others are admitted. The number of hands now
employed in the different parts of the work is [ ] but the
Managers expect to encrease them to25 []. This is a work
of public utility & private advantage.
This visit was not unique-Washington recorded numerous visits to
manufacturers in his diaries 26-but this particular account illustrates
the array of interests served by economic ventures in the early republic.
The corporate form was another incentive that state legislatures
could offer entrepreneurs. On January 15, 1789, a group of investors
petitioned the Massachusetts legislature for a statute incorporating a
cotton manufacture at Beverly. After discussing the private risks and
public benefits associated with the proposed enterprise, the petitioners
wrote,

[I]t is absolutely necessary to the establishment of such
a manufacture as this that the Legislature should grant
some particular favors to the first adventurers,
otherwise to them even success will be attended with a
certain and considerable loss, a sacrifice which they
presume the community cannot reasonably expect.
0Your petitioners, therefore, pray this Honorable Court
to take the premises into their consideration, and grant
them the powers and privileges of an incorporation for
the purpose of establishing and carrying on the
manufacture of cotton and other goods; with such
immunities and favors as they, in their wisdom, shall
think necessary to counterbalance the27 disadvantages
and expenses peculiar to its introduction.
One month later, the legislature passed a resolution incorporating
the company, granting it lands valued at £500 and prescribing a seal for

25. George Washington, Diary Entry (Oct. 28, 1789), in 5 THE DIARIES OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 479, 479 (Donald Jackson & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1979).
26. Id. at 468-69 (visit of October 20, 1789, to a textile manufacture in Hartford
Connecticut, which received bounties and tax exemptions from the state). Id. at 486-87
(visit of October 30, 1789, to the Beverly Cotton Manufactory in Massachusetts, which had
been incorporated earlier that year). Id. at 491-92 (visit of November 4, 1789 to the
Sailcloth Manufactory at Haverhill, New Hampshire, which received bounties from the
state.)
27. 1 WILLIAM R. BAGNALL, THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES 92 (1893).
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the corporation. 28 Incorporation brought Beverly Cotton some property
29
advantages but no tax breaks.
The benefits enjoyed by the early American corporation were
different from the ones enjoyed by the modern corporation. 30 Early
manufactures may have incorporated to receive preferential treatment
from the state, but the benefits of incorporation were entirely dependent
on the applicable instrument of incorporation. For example, the first
business incorporated in the United States was a Connecticut silk
manufacture that, unlike Beverly Cotton, enjoyed a twelve-year
exemption from taxes on profits. 31 A 1797 charter incorporated a New
Jersey glass manufacture for a period of fourteen years but, unlike other
corporate charters of the era, made the shareholders liable for the debts
of the company. 32 The chief benefit of incorporation, as opposed to
alternative organizational models, was continuity. As Judge Spencer
Roane of the Supreme Court of Virginia noted, "Those artificial persons
are rendered necessary in the law from the inconvenience, if not
impracticability of keeping alive the rights of associated bodies, by
devolving them on one series of individuals after another."33
During the early decades of the Republic, incorporation occurred on
an ad hoc basis by special legislation only. New York was the first state
to pass a law establishing general procedures for the incorporation of
businesses. The 1811 Act Relative to Incorporations for Manufacturing
Purposes 34 stipulated that any group of five or more persons wishing to
form a company manufacturing textiles, glass, or metal might, upon
filing a certificate with the appropriate authorities, become
a body corporate and politic, in fact and in name, by the
name stated in such certificate, and by that name they
and their successors shall and may have continual
succession, and shall be persons in law capable of suing
and being sued, pleading and being impleaded,
answering and being answered unto, defending and
being defended, in all courts and places whatsoever, in
28. Id. at 94-95 (quoting the resolution passed by the Massachusetts Legislature on
February 17, 1789).
29. For further discussion, see Robert W. Lovett, The Beverly Cotton Manufactory: Or
Some New Light on an Early Cotton Mill, 26 BULL. Bus. HIST. Soc'v. 218, 229-30 (1952).
30. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 22.
31. See DAVIS, supra note 20, at 269-70 (discussing the Director Inspectors and
Company of the Connecticut Silk Manufacturers).
32. Id. at 279.
33. Currie'sAdm'rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc'y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 350 (1809).
34. Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, 1811 N.Y. Laws 1948, reprinted in 3 REVISED
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEWYORK 1949 (Montgomery H. Throop ed., 1889).
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all manner of actions, suits, complaints, matters and
causes whatsoever; and they and their successors may
have a common seal, and the same may make, alter and
change at their pleasure, and that they and their
successors, by their corporate name, shall in law be
capable of buying, purchasing, holding and conveying
any lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, wares and
merchandize whatever, necessary to enable the said
company to carry on their 35manufacturing operations
mentioned in such certificate.
The 1811 law made incorporation a matter of right for those who
met New York's statutory requirements. Connecticut followed in 1837,
enacting the first general incorporation statute allowing entities to
incorporate for any lawful purpose. 36 Other states followed suit.
Early American business corporations were not exclusively a means
of developing financial and transit infrastructure through private
investment. Nor, for that matter, were private corporations seen as
serving private interests alone. As Morton J. Horwitz memorably wrote,
For a time, the corporation continued to occupy a
twilight zone in the eyes of the law, sometimes conceived
of as a public instrumentality, at other times regarded
as a private entity. While they sought to emphasize their
recently acknowledged private nature when claiming
property,
of corporate
protection
constitutional
corporations continued to underline their public service
functions in order to claim both the power of eminent
37
domain and freedom from competition.
The public/private dimensions of the corporation in the early Republic
reflected fundamental ambiguities in corporate law at the state level
38
Hovenkamp,39
that have been explored at length by Horwitz,
41
40
Lamoreaux, and Mark. The coming section attempts to enrich the
35. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
36. See 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49.
37. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 113-14
(1977).

38. Id. at 109-39.
39. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 11-66 (1991).

40. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships,Corporations,and the Limits on Contractual
Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture, in CONSTRUCTING
CORPORATE AMERICA, 29 (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia, eds., 2004).
41. Mark, supranote 11.
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field by focusing on the way the Supreme Court addressed the
ambiguous nature of the corporate form during the Marshall era.
II.

THE MARSHALL COURT AND CORPORATE METAPHYSICS

In 1793, Stewart Kyd's widely circulated Treatise on the Law of
Corporations explained the common law's sometimes confounding
approach to the legal personality of corporations:
Several . . .epithets have been given to a corporation,
which, unless particularly explained, are apt to bewilder
and mislead the understanding: thus it has been said,
that a "corporation aggregate of many, is invisible,
immortal, and rests only in intendment and
consideration of the law"; that it is "a mere metaphysical
42
being, a mere Ens rationis."
Kyd here singled out Sir Edward Coke's characterization of the
corporation as "invisible, immortal, and rest[ing] only in intendment
and consideration of the law." 43 The phrase had become a juridical
commonplace since the Lord Chief Justice formulated it in 1612, but it
left many questions about the nature of corporate personality
unresolved.
This section situates Chief Justice John Marshall's corporations
jurisprudence within the broader English legal tradition, to which he
appealed in deciding cases relating to the legal personality of
corporations. In so doing, it challenges the view that Marshall began his
tenure as Chief Justice as a proponent of the aggregate entity theory of
corporate personality but eventually abandoned it for the artificial
entity theory. 44 This section argues that, instead, Marshall's
corporations jurisprudence was heavily influenced by English precedent,
particularly the decisions of Sir Edward Coke in the Case of Sutton's
42.

1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 15 (1793) (internal

citations omitted). The notion of the corporation as an ens rationishad appeared in a 1682
case in which the Court of King's Bench held that a corporation "is but a name, an ens
rationis,a thing that cannot be seen, and is no substance." Proceedings between the King
and the City of London, (1682) 8 S.T. 1039 (K.B.) 1137. For a colorful biographical sketch
of Stewart Kyd, see Edward Solly, Stewart Kyd, 6 NOTES & QUERIES 12 (1880).
43. Case of Sutton's Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973; 10 Co. Rep. 23 a, 32 b
("[A] corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment
and consideration of law . . . . They cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor
excommunicate, for they have no souls, neither can they appear in person, but by
attorney." (citation omitted)).
44. See sources cited supra note 15.
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Hospital45 and of Sir John Holt in City of London v. Wood.46 In
interpreting and following these precedents, the Chief Justice seems to
have taken his cue from Kyd, adopting Coke's basic view of the
corporation as a creature of the law while recognizing the legal
personality of its members where broader constitutional imperatives so
required. The corporate charter was thus not a law exclusively unto
itself. Rather, the corporate form could be set aside in order to comply
with broader constitutional imperatives.
47
the Supreme Court had
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officers and directors of the bank, all Pennsylvania citizens, sued
Deveaux and Robertson in the Sixth Circuit for recovery of damages,
arguing that the federal courts had diversity jurisdiction over the case.
The defendants countered that the bank was, in fact, "a body politic and
corporate" with citizenship in Georgia, making state court the
appropriate venue for the case. When the Sixth Circuit found for the
defendants, the bank appealed to the Supreme Court.
In its most basic sense, the issue before the Court was a
constitutional one: did the federal judiciary have jurisdiction to hear the
case in diversity?5 0 Reviewing the bank's charter, the Court noted that

45.
46.
47.
48.
that

Case of Sutton's Hospital,77 Eng. Rep. at 960.
(1702) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592; 12 Mod. 669.
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
The Act of Congress incorporating the first Bank of the United States stipulated

[AIll those, who shall become subscribers to the said bank, their successors and
assigns, shall be, and are hereby created and made a corporation and body politic, by
the name and style of The President, Directors and Company, of the Bank of the
United States;... And by that name, shall be, and are hereby made able and capable
in law, to have, purchase, receive, possess, enjoy, and retain . . . lands, rents,
tenements, hereditaments, goods, chattels ... and the same to sell, grant, demise,
aliene or dispose of, to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be
answered, defend and be defended, in courts of record, or any place whatsoever ....
Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191,
192 (Feb. 25, 1791).
49. Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 62. Deveaux marked but one episode in the ongoing
confrontation between the states and the national bank, which culminated in the
landmark case ofMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
to controversies . . . between citizens of
50. "The judicial power shall extend ...
different states." U.S. Const. Art. III. § 2.
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the capacity of the corporation to engage in judicial process was a
settled matter: legal personality, "if not incident to a corporation, is
conferred by every incorporating act . . "51 But just because the Bank
of the United States was a legal person, it did not follow that the bank
was a "citizen" within the meaning of Article III. To Marshall, the
Constitution reserved the term citizen for real (i.e., natural) persons
only.5 2 He explained:
That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere
legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a
citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the
courts of the United States, unless the rights of the
members, in this respect, can be exercised in their
corporate name . . . . Aliens, or citizens of different
states .... [cannot] be supposed to be less the objects of
constitutional provision, because they are allowed to sue
by corporate name. That name, indeed, cannot be an
alien or a citizen; but the persons whom it represents
may be the one or the other; and the controversy is, in
fact and in law, between those persons suing in their
corporate character, by their corporate name, for a
corporate right, and the individual against whom the
53
suit may be instituted.
The corporation was indeed a legal person: an entity with certain rights.
But from the standpoint of diversity jurisdiction, the corporation existed
in name alone; it was simply the vehicle through which the natural
persons who comprised it exercised their rights.
Marshall did not construct this theory of corporate personality from
whole cloth. Rather, he drew richly from the existing body of English
law:
As our ideas of a corporation, its privileges and its
disabilities, are derived entirely from the English books,
we resort to them for aid, in ascertaining its character.
It is defined as a mere creature of the law.
invisible, intangible, and incorporeal. Yet, when we
examine the subject further, we find that corporations
51. Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 85.
52. Id. at 91 ("mhe term citizen ought to be understood as it is used in the
constitution, and as it is used in other laws. That is, to describe the real persons who come
into court, in this case, under their corporate name.").
53. Id. at 86-87.
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have been included within
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appropriated to real persons.

terms
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Here Marshall seems to have been persuaded by the bank's
attorney, Horace Binney,5 5 who cited Stewart Kyd's treatise: "To say
that [a corporation] is an 'ens civile, a jus habendi et agendi, an ens
rationis, a mere metaphysical being, and that it rests only in
consideration and intendment of law,' are terms calculated to mislead
the understanding."5 6 Rather than get mired in the metaphysics of
corporate personhood, Marshall turned to legal precedent, drawing
57
heavily from the 1701 case City of London v. Wood.
One of the main issues in that suit was whether the Mayor of the
City of London could serve as a judge in a case in which he himself was
a litigant. The full background of the case is murky, but Thomas
Woods,58 "being duly chosen sheriff did not serve, or otherwise discharge
himself' 59 by paying a fine in the amount of £400.60 The city therefore
brought suit against Woods in the name of the Mayor and Commonality
of London in a court constituted under the municipal corporation's
charter. The mayor and aldermen served as judges on that court, also as
required by the charter. When the tribunal ruled in the city's favor,
Woods challenged the holding in the Court of King's Bench on the
ground that the mayor could not be the judge in his own case.
The City of London argued that the decision should stand because
54. Id. at 88. R. Kent Newmyer's observation regarding Marshall's contract
jurisprudence is also apt here: "Vhen Marshall applied traditional common-law reasoning
to settle the matter, he was not aiming to disguise the doctrinal constitutional innovations
he was about to make but instead was doing what he had done since he began the practice
of law in the 1780s and what every other American lawyer of the age did: reasoning by
common-law analogy and using common-law definitions and principles to interpret the
words of the Constitution." R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF
THE SUPREME COURT 249-50 (2001).
55. In 1808, Binney was named a director of the Bank of the United States. CHARLES
CHAUNCEY BINNEY, THE LIFE OF HORACE BINNEY 61 (1903). In the same year, he
anonymously authored the notes to the American edition of Kyd's treatise on the law of
awards. See id. at 59.
56. Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 64.
57. (1702) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592; 12 Mod. 669; see Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 90.
58. The defendant's name was abbreviated for the record. See Philip A. Hamburger,
Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091, 2122 (1994).
59. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1592.
60. Id. at 1592. Philip Hamburger explains that the by-laws of the Corporation of the
City of London required those nominated for the position of sheriff either to assume office
and serve or pay a fine of £400. Nominating sheriffs unwilling to serve became a way of
"[f]ishing for Sheriffs or for Money"-that is, raising revenue for the City. Hamburger,
supra note 58, at 2122.
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the mayor had a dual existence of sorts: as "head of the corporation, [he]
acts in his politick capacity, and judges in his natural capacity." 61 The
mayor-as-plaintiff and mayor-as-judge were, in effect, two different
people. 62 But the Court of King's Bench unanimously rejected this
argument, with Chief Justice Sir John Holt writing that
[T]he true great point is, that the Court is held before
the mayor and aldermen, and the action brought in the
names of the mayor and commonalty; and that very
man, who is head of the city, and without whom the city
has no ability or capacity to sue, is the very person
before whom the action is brought; and this cannot be by
the rules of any law whatever, for it is against all laws
that the same person should be party and Judge in the
same cause .... 63
The court acknowledged that the corporation had legal rights all its
own, but when the statutory rights of the corporation conflicted with
constitutional imperatives, the court could set aside the corporate form.
According to Chief Justice Marshall in Deveaux, Wood was "a full
authority for the case now under consideration."6 4 He explained:
In that case the objection, that a corporation was an
invisible, intangible thing, a mere incorporeal legal
entity, in which the characters of the individuals who
composed it were completely merged, was urged and was
considered. The judges unanimously declared that they
could look beyond the corporate name, and notice the
65
character of the individual.
Likewise, Marshall ruled, the Court could look beyond the corporate
name of the board of the Bank and notice the citizenship of its
individual shareholders in deciding the question of Article III
jurisdiction. He concluded that the federal courts could exercise

61. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1602.
62. See id. Compare id. (treating the mayor as having two distinct existences of sorts),
with ERNST H. KANTOROWIcZ, THE KING's Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY (7th ed. 1997) (tracing the concept of a king having a political body and a
natural body). For a discussion of the constitutional implications of Wood, see Hamburger,
supra note 58.
63. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1602.
64. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 90 (1809).
65. Id.
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diversity jurisdiction only when the citizenships of the bank's
shareholders gave rise to it.
Both Wood and Deveaux are as much cases about the scope of
judicial power as they are statements of corporate theory. For just as
allowing the Mayor of London to be the judge in his own case would
have compromised the basic principles of justice enshrined in the
English Constitution, so too would treating the Bank of the United
States as a citizen independent of its members have been contrary to
Article III. Thus Marshall emphasized the precedential value of Wood
as follows: "The case . . . is the stronger [precedent], because it is on the
point of jurisdiction." 66 In this respect, both cases deal with the complex
reality of the corporation as a unit of legal authority in political society.
The corporation has legal rights and powers that can be invoked
externally with regard to the state and internally with regard to its
individual members. But all these powers are subordinate to broader
constitutional imperatives.
The full implications of Marshall's decision to treat the corporation
as an aggregation of the rights of its members for the purpose of federal
jurisdiction became more apparent in the 1829 circuit case of Bank of
the United States v. McKenzie,67 in which Chief Justice Marshall, riding
circuit, had to consider whether a corporation might have a place of
residence. "The president and directors, at Philadelphia, are neither the
nominal nor real plaintiffs," he explained; rather, "[t]he nominal
plaintiffs, are the president, directors and company; the real plaintiffs,
are all the stockholders."68 Elaborating on the theory he had introduced
in Deveaux, Marshall explained that the court
might look behind, or through the name of the
corporation, and see the individuals who were the actual
plaintiffs who constituted that legal entity in whose
[Deveaux] makes the
name the corporation acted ....
place where any
[corporation] a resident of every
69
resides.
corporation
member of the
Just as the corporation lacked citizenship independent of its members'
citizenship, so too did it lack a domicile independent of the respective
domiciles of its shareholders.
Taken in this context, Marshall's description of corporate

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
2 F. Cas. 718 (Cir. Ct. D. Va. 1829) (No. 927).
Id. at 721.
Id.
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personality in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 7o is not quite
the turning point that some have claimed it to be. 7 1 In Dartmouth
College, the Chief Justice described the corporation as "an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence." 72 To be sure, Marshall here casts the
corporation in terms evocative of the artificial entity theory of corporate
personality. But this approach can be reconciled with his ruling in
Deveaux. There. he likewise described the coruoration as "a mere
creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorporeal," 73 but a
creature whose form had to be set aside for jurisdictional purposes and
in order to avoid an improper exercise of diversity jurisdiction.
Unlike in Deveaux, where the issue was the nature of the
corporation as a legal person, in Dartmouth College the issue was the
nature of the corporate charter as a legal instrument. In 1816, the state
of New Hampshire amended the charter of Dartmouth College,
effectively turning it into a public institution. A number of trustees
challenged the constitutionality of the state laws on the ground that
they impaired the trustees' contract rights in violation of the Contract
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.74 The Chief Justice found for the
trustees, holding that the corporate charter was indeed a contract
between two parties-in this case, King George III and the original
trustees of the college. 75 Under this contract, "[ain artificial, immortal
70. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
71. Liam Seamus O'Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personalityof
the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 207 (2006) (discussing the role of social
contract theory in Dartmouth and noting, "The celebrated Dartmouth College decision of
1819 announced a sea change in corporate theory and law that was already well under
way. Relying on familiar principles of American political and constitutional theory, the
case declared that the corporation was an immortal being with a soul - a group of trustees
endowed with the power to govern the corporation.").
72. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.
73. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
74. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1. ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contract ....
").
75. See Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 643-44 ('This is plainly a contract to which the
donors, the trustees, and the crown, (to whose rights and obligations New Hampshire
succeeds,) were the original parties. It is a contract made on a valuable consideration. It is
a contract for the security and disposition of property. It is a contract, on the faith of
which, real and personal estate has been conveyed to the corporation. It is then a contract
within the letter of the constitution, and within its spirit also, unless the fact, that the
property is invested by the donors in trustees for the promotion of religion and education,
for the benefit of persons who are perpetually changing, though the objects remain the
same, shall create a particular exception, taking this case out of the prohibition contained
in the constitution."). The decision built upon the Court's previous holding in Fletcher v.
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being, was created by the crown, capable of receiving and distributing
forever, according to the will of the donors, the donations which should

be made to

it."76

According to Marshall, the corporation constituted under this
contract represented the aggregate aims of the original trustees and
perpetuated those aims through its immortal form. In each successive
generation, Marshall explained, the trustees are
represented by the corporation. The corporation is the
assignee of their rights, stands in their place, and
distributes their bounty, as they would themselves have
distributed it, had they been immortal. So with respect
to the students who are to derive learning from this
source. The cornoration is a trustee for them also. Their
distributively, are
which,
taken
potential rights,
imperceptible, amount collectively to a most important
interest. These are, in the aggregate, to be exercised,
77
asserted and protected, by the corporation.
On this view, the trustees had assigned their rights to the corporation
under the charter. The corporation could, in turn, exercise those rights
to further the interests of the trustees and the intended beneficiaries.
The implications of this ruling for the development of corporate law
in the United States were far reaching. As R. Kent Newmyer notes, by
allowing the corporation to "derive its legal rights by analogy to the
individuals who comprised it . . . the corporation, in addition to the
power accrued by its associative character, would fall heir to the
impressive body of property rights given to individuals by AngloAmerican law." 78 However, the Court's ruling in Dartmouth College in
no way negates the approach to corporate personality it adopted in

Peck, which held that a state grant to a private company was a contract under the
Contract Clause of the Constitution. See 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 123 (1810). C.f. Larry E.
Ribstein, The ConstitutionalConception of the Corporation,4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 98
(1995) (discussing the limits of this contract theory of the corporate charter).
76. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 642.
77. Id. at 642-43.
78. R. Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story's Doctrine of "Public and Private
Corporations"and the Rise of the American Business Corporation,25 DEPAuL L. REV. 825,
826 (1976); see also NEWMYER, supra note 54, at 244-53 (discussing the impact of
Marshall's opinion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward on the corporate question). Justice
Story's concurring opinion in Dartmouth College enriched Justice Marshall's majority
opinion. Story drew heavily from Edward Coke's opinion in Sutton's Hospital in explaining
the nature of eleemosynary corporations. See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 671-76 (Story,
J., concurring).
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Deveaux. The corporation is indeed a creature of the law, but one that
represents the aggregate rights of its shareholders, one that can
exercise the right of contract, 79 and one whose form may be set aside in
order to avoid a violation of the Constitution.
Furthermore, when Marshall refers to the "properties which the
[corporate] charter... confers upon [the corporation], either expressly,
or as incidental to its very existence" 80 or to the corporation as "one
entire impersonal entity," 81 he is appealing directly to the common law's
conception of the corporation as formulated by Coke. In The Case of
Sutton's Hospital,8 2 Coke offered a summation of the rights of
corporations under the common law:
[W]hen a Corporation is duly created, all other incidents
are tacit annexed [to it] .... [Therefore divers clauses
subsequent in the charters are not of necessity, but only
declaratory, and might well have been left out. As 1. By
the same to have authority, ability, and capacity to
purchase, but no clause is added that they may alien....
and it need not, for it is incident. 2. To sue and be sued,
implead and be impleaded. 3. To have a Seal .... that is
also declaratory, for when they are incorporated they
may make or use what seal they will. 4. To restrain
them from aliening or demising but in certain form ...
5. That the survivors shall be the corporation .... 8 3
On this view, the corporation is not entirely dependent upon the express
terms of its charter for its powers. Some capacities are implicit in
("tacit6 annexed to") the corporation by its very nature. 84
79. See Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 169 (1804) ("The act of
incorporation is to [corporations] an enabling act; it gives them all the power they possess;
it enables them to contract, and when it prescribes to them a mode of contracting, they
must observe that mode....").
80. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
81. Bank of the United States v. Dandridge,25 U.S. 64, 91 (1827).
82. (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973; 10 Co. Rep. 23 a.
83. Id. at 970.
84. Blackstone offered a more modern iteration of Coke's view of the corporation in his
Commentaries,explaining:
After a corporation is so formed and named, it acquires many powers, rights,
capacities, and incapacities . . . . Some of these are necessarily and inseparably
incident to every corporation; which incidents, as soon as a corporation is duly
erected, are tacitly annexed of course. As, 1. To have perpetual succession .... 2. To
sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by it's [sic] corporate
name, and do all other acts as natural persons may. 3. To purchase lands, and hold
them, for the benefit of themselves and their successors ....
4. To have a common
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Although this conception of the corporation had begun to develop in
England during the Middle Ages, 8 5 Holdsworth links its florescence in
Coke's writings to contemporary developments in constitutional
theory.8 6 Just as a royal charter could not alter the common law or
not
fundamental rights of the individual, so too could a royal charter
87
of
City
corporations.
of
rights
fundamental
or
law
common
the
alter
London v. Wood represents the first of these two propositions in a
particularly salient way. There, the royal charter in question was the
charter of the corporation of the City of London. In nullifying one of its
provisions, Chief Justice Holt invoked Coke's decision in Bonham's
Case, noting:
[W]hat my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's case... is
far from any extravagancy, for it is a very reasonable
and true saying, that if an Act of Parliament should
ordain that the same person should be party and Judge,
in his own cause, it
or, which is the same thing, Judge
88
Parliament.
of
Act
void
a
be
would
In Terrett v. Taylor, the Marshall Court had occasion to consider the
second proposition: whether a statute could alter the common law rights
of a corporation. In that case, the corporation in question was the
Episcopal Church in Virginia. In 1801, the Virginia legislature passed a
statute expropriating all property of the Episcopal Church and
authorizing the state to sell it for the benefit of the parish poor. When
the members of the church challenged the statute, Justice Story, writing
for the Court, noted that "the common law of the land . . .is a tacit

seal. For a corporation, being an invisible body, cannot manifest it's [sic] intentions
by any personal act or oral discourse: it therefore acts and speaks only by it's [sic]
common seal .... 5. To make by-laws or private statutes for the better government
of the corporation .. "
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 463 (1765).

85. See W. S. Holdsworth, English CorporationLaw in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31
YALE L.J. 382, 385-92 (1922) (discussing the deduction of corporations' powers, capacities,
and liabilities during the Middle Ages).
86. See id. at 392.
87. See id. ('It was well recognized that the king's charter could neither change the
common law nor alter the rights and duties of private persons as fixed by law. To hold,
therefore, that the king could neither give nor take away powers from a corporation which
he could not give or take away from a natural man was quite in accordance with this
constitutional doctrine.")
88. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1602; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of
Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 526-35 (2006) (discussing cases that develop the
principle that corporate bylaws cannot contradict the laws of the state).
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condition annexed to the creation of every . . . corporation."8 9 Thus,
under the common law a state could treat as forfeit the property of a
corporation that lost its franchise; but as long as the corporation was in
good standing, "the principles of natural justice, . . .the fundamental
laws of every free government, . . . the spirit and the letter of the
constitution of the United States, and . . . the decisions of most
respectable judicial tribunals" 90 applied to it.
In many respects, the Marshall Court's approach to the legal
personality of corporations has more in common with early-modern
corporate theory than with modern corporate theory. To Coke and his
English successors, the corporation was "invisible, immortal, & rest[ing]
only in intendment and consideration of the law."9 1 To Marshall and his
brethren, it was likewise "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law." 92 To be sure, jurists on both sides
of the Atlantic debated the nature of the corporation as a creature of the
law. But central to the Anglo-American approach until the midnineteenth century was the notion that the corporation was not solely a
creature of positive law; 93 rather, the corporation was as much a
creature of the common law as it was of legislative enactment. 94
III.

THE CIVIL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT: LIKE SCENERY IN TWILIGHT?

The previous section explored how the English conception of
corporate personality was transplanted onto American soil in the early
decades of the Republic by the Marshall Court's fidelity to common law
precedent. To Marshall, the corporation was indeed an "artificial being"
recognized by positive law but protected from legislative intrusion by
the common law and the Constitution. Thus did the Marshall Court
89. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51 (1815).
90. Id. at 52.
91. Case of Sutton's Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973; 10 Co. Rep. 23 a, 32

b.
92. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
93. See Case of Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. at 970 ("[D]vers [sic] clauses
subsequent in the charters are ... only declaratory.").
94. See id. For an opposing view, compare Maximilian Koessler, The Person in
Imagination or PersonaFicta or the Corporation,9 LA. L. REV. 435, 441 (1949) ("This idea,
which has meanwhile become obsolete in the Anglo-American law, ran somewhat like this:
Since the corporation was a legal rather than a natural creature, it could not exist without
an individual license for its creation, to be granted by the legislative body which, in those
early days, was the king. Later on, an act of Parliament or, in the American states, a socalled private statute, authorizing the establishment of a specifically indicated
corporation, took the place of a Royal Charter. As a final development, statutes would in a
general way, that is, without reference to a specific corporation, fix in advance the
conditions under which corporations could be created with validity before the law.").
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nullify laws that altered or abrogated the rights recognized under
corporate charters. During the mid-nineteenth century, however, the
Court began to conceive of corporations as creatures of positive law
whose rights were derived entirely from the charters constituting them.
This section focuses on the role that continental theories of corporate
personality played in guiding that positivist turn.
The earliest movement in this direction can be detected in the
groundbreaking case of Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad v.
Letson.95 In that case, the Court revisited its jurisdictional holdings in
97
96
and Strawbridge v. Curtiss.
Bank of United States v. Deveaux
Strawbridge required complete diversity of citizenship between the
parties for the federal judiciary to exercise jurisdiction. 98 Taken together
with the Deveaux holding that courts must set aside the corporate form
when ascertaining citizenship, Strawbridgemade it all but impossible to
establish federal jurisdiction over corporations, which were by now
playing an increasingly expansive role in the national economy. Letson
overturned Marshall's ruling in Deveaux, ruling:
A corporation created by a state to perform its functions
under the authority of that state and only suable there,
though it may have members out of the state, seems to
us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting
and belonging to that state, and therefore entitled, for
the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a
citizen of that state. 99
The decision profoundly altered corporate law in the United States,
making the corporation a citizen of the state that had created it. From
then on, corporate citizenship would be ascertained independently of
shareholder citizenship.
The reasoning in Letson is confoundingly opaque. That Deveaux had
become unworkable seems to have been reason enough for the Court to
overturn the precedent. 00 But the Court did suggest that the oral

95. Letson, 43 U.S. 497.
96. Compare id. at 555-56, with Bank of the United States v. Deveaax, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61, 86-88 (1809).
97. Compare Letson, 43 U.S. at 555-56, with Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267, 267-68 (1806).
98. Thus, if one of the plaintiffs is a citizen of the same state as one of the defendants,
there is no diversity of citizenship. See Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267.
99. Letson, 43 U.S. at 555.
100. See id. ("After mature deliberation, we feel free to say that the cases of Strawbridge
and Curtis [sic] and that of the Bank and Deveaux were carried too far, and that
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arguments presented by counsel helped shape the ruling: "Deveaux [was
decidedi after armument of ereat abilitv. But never since that case has
the question been presented to this court, with the really distinguished
ability of the arguments of the counsel in this-in no way surpassed by
those in the former."'101 Indeed, the court reporter thought the oral
arguments so important to the case that he included them in the case
report, explaining, "The case was submitted upon printed arguments;
and, on account of its great importance, the reporter has thought it
10 2
proper to insert these arguments in extenso."
Reviewing the record of the oral arguments, one finds that the case
made by the attorney for the railroad contained no surprises: Deveaux
barred the court from treating the corporation as a citizen under Article
III and Strawbridge required the Court to dismiss the case for lack of
diversity jurisdiction. 1 03 The matter was effectively res judicata. But
Letson's attorneys advanced two novel lines of argument. James Louis
Petigru and Henry Lesesne, law partners from South Carolina, 104 were
the first to argue for the respondent. They proposed a highly technical
approach: the Court should narrowly interpret Deveaux to allow the
Court to consider only the citizenship of the corporate officers-not that
of shareholders-for the purposes of federal jurisdiction. 105
They were followed by their friend and fellow South Carolinian
Hugh Swinton Legar6, then Attorney General of the United States. 0 6
Legar6 urged the Court to consider the corporation in an entirely
different light and overturn Deveaux:
A corporation, or to speak in the more accurate and
scientific language of the continental jurists, "a juridical
person," is, as I have said, a creature of the law, known
consequences and inferences have been argumentatively drawn from the reasoning
employed in the latter which ought not to be followed.").
101. Id.
102. See id. at 498
103. See id. at 499-500.
104. WILLAM HENRY PEASE & JANE H. PEASE, JAMES Louis PETIGRU: SOUTHERN
CONSERVATIVE, SOUTHERN DISSENTER 76 (2002).
105. Letson, 43 U.S. at 507-514.
106. WILLIAM HENRY PEASE & JANE H. PEASE, JAMES Louis PETRIGRU, 36, 43 (2002) (on
the friendship between Petigru and Legar6). Pease and Pease claim that Legar6 argued
the case in his capacity as attorney general, but this is highly unlikely. Id. at 108. The
United States government had no direct interest in the case, and the record states clearly
that Legar6 was representing Letson as co-counsel. Until 1853, when Caleb Cushing
became Attorney General of the United States, it was the norm for United States
Attorneys General to maintain a private legal practice while in office in order to
supplement their meager salaries. Henry Barrett Learned, The Attorney-General and the
Cabinet, 24 POL. SCI. Q. 444 (1909).
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to it under a given name, whose essence is in that name,
and the social identity it implies-whose capacities are
defined in its charter-whose will is expressed under its
seal-whose unity is affected by no change in the parts
that compose it-and whose existence survives the
deaths of its members.
It is, properly considered, a personification of certain
legal rights under a description imposed upon it by the
power that created it. Its name is a thing-it is every
thing [sic]: this creature of law is a standing fiction and
style-stat nominis umbra.
The first consequence of this definition is, that the whole
is essentially and unchangeably different from all the
in it as
parts, which are as completely merged and 10lost
7
the ingredients are in a chemical compound.
Here, Legar 6 urged the Supreme Court to abandon the common law
conception of the corporation as a legal entity representing the
aggregate rights of its members and instead adopt the continental
08
approach, which conceived of the corporation as a legal fiction.' This
distinction is important from a theoretical standpoint. In referring to
the corporation as an artificial person, common law judges from Coke
through Marshall conceived of it as an actual entity in contradistinction
to a fictitious one. To be sure, this conception is not identical to the
modern "real entity" theory of the corporation. Rather, by "artificial
person," the common law tradition conceived of the corporation as an
artifact, a legal person created 'in accordance with the rules of art'-the
lawyer's art."'1 9 Corporate personality as a legal artifact was no more
fictitious than a house built of bricks and mortar or a table built of wood
and nails. None of these things exist in nature, but they are brought
into existence by human craft. And unlike with Legar6's "chemical
compound," we can still discern the parts in the corporate whole.
Legar6's argument before the Court is also important for historical
reasons because it anticipates by more than three decades John Austin's
0
formulation of corporations as "[flictitious or legal persons."" Peter
107. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 520.
108. See id. at 520-21.
109. Pollock, supra note 16, at 220.
110. See JOHN AUSTIN, Analysis of the Term 'Right, in LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE,
OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 159, 164 (John Murray Albemarle Street ed.,
student ed. 1880) ("The nature of legal persons is various, and the ideas for which they
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Stein suggests that Austin was first to introduce the phrase "legal
person" into English as a translation of the civil law concept of the
"juristischePerson."'' While Legar6 seems to have beaten Austin to it,
Austin certainly takes the credit for the diffusion of the term.
Like Austin, Legar6 had been profoundly influenced by the writings
of Carl Friedrich von Savigny, 112 whose works he quoted at length in
oral argument:
"A corporation," as the greatest jurist of our day
expresses it, "consists of the whole, formed of its
members. The will of a corporation is not merely
concurring the will of all its members, but that even of a
bare majority of them. Therefore, the will of a bare
majority of all its existing members is to be regarded as
having the disposal, and being invested with all the
rights of the corporation. This rule is founded on the law
of nature, inasmuch as, if unanimity were demanded, it
would be quite impossible for any corporation to will and
to act. It is also confirmed by the Roman law."'113

stand extremely complex. They are persons by a figment, and for the sake of brevity in
discourse. By ascribing rights and duties to feigned persons, instead of the physical
persons whom they in truth concern, we are frequently able to abridge our descriptions of
them.").
111. Peter Stein, Nineteenth Century English Company Law and Theories of Legal
Personality, 11/12 QUADERNI FIORENTINI 503, 509-10 (1982/1983) (It.). This notion had its
roots in the concept of the persona ficta, which flourished in medieval political thought.
Joseph P. Canning, Ideas of the State in Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century
Commentators on the Roman Law, 33 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOC'Y, 1,
23-24 (1983) ("Developing the formulation.., that the corporation was a persona ficta
(fictive person) the Commentators maintained that through legal fiction the state was a
persona in law, that is to say, through a legal construction they attributed to the state in
its abstract aspect legal existence and capacity-legal personality in short. Overt use of
the term, persona, to denote a legal person was an invention of the thirteenth-century
jurists: persona was not used in that sense in the Corpus luris Civilis, although that usage
was anticipated to some extent in theological terms by the Augustinian identification of
Christ as the personaecclesiae.").
112. WILFRED E. RUMBLE, DOING AUSTIN JUSTICE: THE RECEPTION OF JOHN AUSTIN'S
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 93 (2005); W.L. MORRISON, JOHN
AUSTIN 19-20 (1982).
113. Letson, 43 U.S. at 522. A review of the citation provided by Legar6 reveals that he
was translating directly from the German edition in his oral argument. See id. ("Savigny's
System of the Roman Law, as it now is, vol. 2, p. 329, sect. 97, cites L. 160, sect. 1, reg.
jur., Dig. 50, 17."). At the time of his death in 1843, Legar6's library contained Germanlanguage copies of Savigny's Recht des Besitzes (1837), System des heutigem Romischen
Rechts (1840), and Geschichte des Romischen Rechts in Mittelalter (1834). CATALOGUE OF
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Again, Legar6 appears to urge the Court to adopt the civil law
approach. But then, in a surprising logical leap, he synthesizes the
continental view of corporate personality with the common law view:
And so it is by the common law, of which I have just
cited the received maxim on this head. Indeed, as
Savigny remarks, it must be so in the nature of things,
and the consequence is irresistible, that, to set up the
will of a few members of a society, artificially organized
into a body corporate, against that of the majority or the
governing part of it, is to violate fundamental principles,
114
and to confound all ideas of such an association.
There is no talk here of the Constitution, Article III, or of the meaning
of citizenship. To Legar6, the civil law approach to corporate personality
reflects the law of nature, and the law of nature is part of the common
law. Therefore, the Court should assimilate the civil law theory of
corporate personality into the common law.
For Legar6, these were not arguments borne purely of expedience.
The Attorney General was a true believer in his cause. Indeed, when
Legar6 died prematurely at the age of forty-six, President Tyler
5
eulogized:"
It may be said without fear of mistake that he was more

THE LIBRARY OF THE HON. HUGH S. LEGARt, LATE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND ATTORNEY

at
available
(1843),
12
STATES
UNITED
THE
OF
GENERAL
No
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgilpt?id=nnc2.ark:/13960/t7vm5kt5s;view-lup;seq=4.
French or English translations of the works appear in the catalogue. The first volume of
Savigny's System of the Modern Roman Law was not available in English translation until
1867. I SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW, William Holloway, tr. (1867). The second
volume would not be published in translation for another two decades. JURAL RELATIONS;
OR, THE ROMAN LAW OF PERSONS AS SUBJECTS OF JURAL RELATIONS: BEING A
TRANSLATION OF THE SECOND BOOK OF SAVIGNY'S SYSTEM OF MODERN ROMAN LAW, W. H.

Rattigan, tr. (1884) ("A translation of the first volume has, indeed, been published by Mr.
Holloway, a learned judge of the Madras High Court, who has since retired from the
service; and the eighth volume, which forms a complete treatise in itself on Private
International Law, has been admirably translated by Mr. Guthrie, an Advocate of the
Scotch Bar.... But the intermediate volumes still lie clothed in their original language,
unknown to and unconsulted by far the great majority of English lawyers and law
students." Id. at iii.)
114. Letson, 43 U.S. at 522.
115. EDWARD P. CRAPOL, JOHN TYLER: THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT 193-94 (2006).
Legar6 died in Boston on June 20, 1843, as the city was celebrating the anniversary of the
Battle of Bunker Hill. At the time, he was serving as both Attorney General and interim
Secretary of State.
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deeply read in the civil law, than any other man in the
Union. On all questions involving its principles, he was
the Magnus Apollo of the court. With all his reverence
for the common law, he had a still greater for the civil,
as a more perfect system of justice. He sought on all
occasions to soften down the seeming asperities of the
first, by an infusion into it of the principles of the last. 1 6
As a young man Legar6 had spent a year at the University of
Edinburgh studying the civil law.117 He renewed these studies with
great enthusiasm from 1832 to 1836, when he served as the first U.S.
charg6 d'affaires to Belgium. He kept diaries of his time on the
continent, including a journal of his travels through the Rhine region of
Prussia in 1835. Here Legar6 described his immersion in the study of
contemporary continental legal writings, notably those of Savigny."18 In
one journal entry, Legar6 recounted a dinner conversation with
Prussian historian Friedrich Ancillon:
Conversation turns on M. de Savigny, who, I regret to
learn, is not in Berlin, it being a vacation. M. Ancillon
says, excellent as his works are, his lectures are still
better; delivered with a charming ease, grace and
clearness, and giving you the idea of a man who is quite
above the subject he treats of, and makes a pastime of it.
I tell him it is just the impression made on me by his
famous History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages.
[We] [s]peak of his general doctrine, and that of the
historical school ....
[I] [p]rofess myself of that school
hautement.1 9
But Legar6's enthusiasm was not shared by his friend, German poet and
translator August Wilhelm Schlegel. In a different journal entry, Legar6
recorded the poet's remark on Savigny's work: "[The civil law [is] like
scenery in twilight,-you may make what you please of it."120
116. Speech by John Tyler, The Dead of the Cabinet (delivered Apr. 24, 1856) in 23
SOUTHERN LITERARY MESSENGER 81, 83 (1846).
117. See MICHAEL O'BRIEN, Politics, Romanticism, and Hugh Legarg: "The Fondness of
DisappointedLove", in RETHINKING THE SOUTH: ESSAYS IN INTELLEcTUAL HISTORY 57, 59
(1993).
118. See, e.g., HUGH SWINTON LEGARP, Journal of the Rhine (Apr. 27, 1836), in 1
WRITINGS OF HUGH SWINTON LEGARik 135 (De Capo Press 1970) (1846).
119. Id.
120. Journal of the Rhine (May 25, 1835), in 1 WRITINGS OF HUGH SWINTON LEGARt,
supra note 118, at 117.
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In a sense, Schlegel's remark evocatively captures the role of the
civil law in Letson. The Court does not explicitly cite any of the other
121
but
continental sources adduced by Legar4 nor does it cite Savigny;
the presence of the civil law is palpable in the twilight of the decision's
murky reasoning when the Letson Court goes farther than it must in
deciding the case. "The case before us might be safely put upon the
foregoing reasoning," 122 Justice Wayne wrote, referring to the Court's
holding that the corporation is a citizen of the state in which it was
incorporated. "But," he continued,
there is a broader ground upon which we wish to be
understood, upon which we altogether rest our present
judgment, although it might be maintained upon the
narrower ground already suggested. It is, that a
corporation created by and doing business in a
particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and
purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an
inhabitant of the same state, for the purposes of its
incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of
that state, as much as a natural person. Like a citizen it
makes contracts, and though in regard to what it may do
in some particulars it differs from a natural person, and
in this especially, the manner in which it can sue and be
sued, it is substantially, within the meaning of the law,
a citizen of the state which created it.123
Here the Court does not adopt the civil law's conception of the
corporation as a legal fiction but rather Legar6's synthesis of the civil
law and common law approaches to corporate personality. The

121. See Letson, 43 U.S. at 557. Michael Hoeflich mistakenly claims that the Court cites
Savigny's System of Roman Law in its opinion. See M.H. Hoeflich, Translation & the
Reception of Foreign Law in the Antebellum United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 773
(2002). He can certainly be excused for this small error, as the record of Legar's oral
argument runs approximately twice as many pages as the court's ruling. Compare Letson,
43 U.S. at 514-29 (recount of oral argument), with id. at 550-59 (court opinion). Hoeflich
also suggests that "it seems most likely that the reference [in Letson] is to the English
translation of [Savigny's System of the Roman Law]." Hoeflich, supra, at 773. However,
the work was not available in English translation until 1867. See supra sources cited and
text accompanying note 113. It is instead likely that Legar6 was working from a Germanlanguage edition of Savigny. See supra sources cited and text accompanying note 113. On
the availability of translations of some of Savigny's other works in the United States, see
Hoeflich, supra,at 765.
122. Letson, 43 U.S. at 557.
123. Id. at 557-58.
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corporation is constituted by the laws of the state and derives its powers
from it. It is, to be sure, an artificial person, but it possesses a legal
status different from that of its members. 124
Taken in light of the Court's transformative ruling, Justice Wayne's
remark about the quality of oral argument and the unconventional
inclusion of those arguments in the case report are highly suggestive. It
would probably be going too far to say that Legar6's arguments were
responsible for this turning point in U.S. corporate law; it may well be
that the Court would have come to the same conclusion even if Legar6
had never argued the case. Yet it might also be that Legar6's arguments
were reported to give the opinion a gloss of theoretical legitimacy.
Whatever the case, Peter Stein's observation of English law seems to
apply equally to American law here: "Legal personality is a classic
example of the way in which English law manages to avoid theory as
long as possible and then turns to contemporary continental doctrine
when at last it needs a theoretical explanation of the institutions which
it has developed pragmatically."1 25
From a pragmatic standpoint, recognizing that the corporation was
a legal person wholly independent of its members helped the Letson
Court rationalize its desired outcome: the extension of Article III
jurisdiction to corporations on the basis of the state in which they were
incorporated. But the Court was not prepared to carry the Letson
holding on corporate citizenship any further when it came to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. In
Paul v. Virginia,126 the Court held, "The term citizens as there used
applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing
allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the
legislature, and possessing only the attributes which the legislature has
127
prescribed."

124. See id. The ruling was affirmed in Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 227, 233 (1858) ("[Ilnasmuch as the corporators were not parties to the suit in
their individual characters, but merely as members and component parts of the body or
legal entity which the charter created, the members who composed it ought to be
presumed, so far as its contracts and liabilities are concerned, to reside where the domicil
of the body was fixed by law, and where alone they could act as one person; and to the
same extent, and for the same purposes, be also regarded as citizens of the State from
which this legal being derived its existence, and its faculties and powers.").
125. Stein, supra note 110, at 503.
126. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
127. Id. at 177. Phillip I. Blumberg accounts for this limitation, noting "as a matter of
constitutional development, opening the federal courts to litigation involving corporations
is a very different issue than permitting states to exclude corporations in matters not
involving interstate commerce. The fact that the same constitutional term, 'citizen' was
employed did not prevent conflicting conclusions on its applicability to corporations."
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Whether the corporation enjoyed any substantive rights as a citizen
beyond the jurisdictional guarantees of Article III went largely
unexamined until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
changed the legal landscape of the nation. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides in part that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 128
Who, exactly, constituted a "person" protected by the amendment
immediately became a point of public contention. In Santa Clara County
v. Southern Pacific Railway Company, the court reporter included a
breathtakingly brief note:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies129to these corporations. We
are all of opinion that it does.

Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 307 (1990).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). See also Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v.
Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) ('It is now settled that corporations are persons within
the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property
without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.");
Charlotte & Columbia R.R. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 391 (1892) ("[N]o State shall deny to
any person the equal protection of the laws. Private corporations are persons within the
meaning of the amendment; it has been so held in several cases by this
court."); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 33 (1889) ("[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment does not limit the subjects in relation to which the police power of
the State may be exercised for the protection of its citizens. That this power should be
applied to railroad companies is reasonable and just."); Pembina Mining Co. v. Pa., 125
U.S. 181, 189 (1888) ("The equal protection of the laws which [corporations] may claim is
only such as is accorded to similar associations within the jurisdiction of the State."); Mo.
Pac. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205, 209 (1888) ("It is conceded that corporations are persons
within the meaning of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment."); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v.
Herrick, 127 U.S. 210, 212 (1888) (holding that a law imposing liabilities on a corporation
is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Morton J. Horwitz surveyed the lower court rulings that anticipated
Santa Clarain search of the rationale behind this cryptic holding. 130 A.1
supported a conception of the corporation most notably advanced by
Justice Field in the 1882 Railroad Tax Cases131-a conception of which
Chief Justice Marshall may well have approved:
Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but
... they consist of aggregations of individuals united for
some legitimate business. . . . It would be a most
singular result if a constitutional provision intended for
the protection of every person against partial and
discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to
exert such protection the moment the person becomes a
member of a corporation .... On the contrary, we think
that it is well established by numerous adjudications of
the Supreme Court of the United States . . . that
whenever a provision of the constitution, or of a law,
guarantees to persons the enjoyment of property. . . the
benefits of the provision extend to corporations, and that
the courts will always look beyond the name of the
artificial being to the individuals whom it represents. 132
Horwitz showed that, far from departing from the common law view of
the corporation as an aggregate entity, Santa Clara affirmed it,
recognizing that the corporate form did not establish a juridical double
standard with respect to the protection of property rights. The
corporation was a legal person separate from its shareholders, but the
property rights of the shareholders could only be upheld by recognizing
that the corporation itself represented an aggregation of their rights.
However, this meaning was lost in the decision's subsequent reception
and interpretation.
The first major departure from the aggregate theory of corporate
personality occurred, according to Horwitz, in Hale v. Henkel,133 where
130. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1985).
131. San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co. (Railroad Tax Cases), 13 F. 722, 744 (D. Cal. 1882)
(holding that constitutional and legal protections of property apply as much to
corporations as to the members thereot).
132. Horwitz, supra note 130, at 178 (quoting Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722). Horwitz
shows that the attorney for the corporation made this very argument in Santa Clara.See
id. at 177-78.
133. See id. at 182. For a discussion of early twentieth-century decisions rejecting the
notion that a corporation enjoys the same rights as a natural person, see also id. at 182,
n.46.
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the Supreme Court held that corporations are protected by the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Court explained:
[T]he corporation is a creature of the State. It is
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.
It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and
holds them subject to the laws of the State and the
limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law.
It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its
rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so
long as it obeys the laws of its creation. . . . [But] [iun
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can
only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is
protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, against
unlawful discrimination. Corporations are a necessary
feature of modern business activity, and their
aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all
great enterprises. 134
The Court here recognized that the corporation is a creature of the law,
but the corporation is no fiction. It is a real entity bounded by the law
and protected by the Constitution. The Court in Hale did not explain
how to determine what constitutional immunities were "appropriate" to
a corporation, but the ruling set in motion the gradual recognition that
some provisions of the Bill of Rights applied to artificial corporate
persons as well as to natural persons.
Perhaps the most telling part of the Court's ruling in Hale was its
passing observation that "[clorporations are a necessary feature of
modern business activity, and their aggregated capital has become the
135
The rise of the modern
source of nearly all great enterprises."'
business corporation had far outpaced the law's ability to rationalize
and harmonize its role in American life. American legal theorists
attempted to fill the breach, finding in contemporary European
136
accounts of corporate
writings, particularly those of Otto von Gierke,

134. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75, 76 (1906) (internal citations omitted).
135. Id. at 76.
136. Maitland's translation of Otto von Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle Ages,
together with his own works on the corporate form, were especially influential in this
regard, profoundly influencing America's legal realist school. DAVID RUNcIMAN,
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personality ideas that seemed well suited to meet contemporary
challenges.
Writing at the end of the nineteenth century, Ernst Freund
cautioned that "the analysis of the nature of legal conceptions without
immediate or exclusive reference to practical questions.., is apt to lose
itself in metaphysical speculations and refined distinctions of little
substantial value."137 As an additional peril, "there is always some
danger that an error in fundamental conceptions may lead now and
then to incorrect practical conclusions, or-a less objectionable
alternative-to unsound reasoning in order to support a sound
decision."' 38 Having never theorized the corporation ex ante, during the
late nineteenth century American jurists instead began trying to
theorize it ex post. The Supreme Court's ruling in Letson, which marked
American law's first significant departure from the prevailing common
law conception of the corporation, paved the way for the eventual
reception of real entity theory. Through that theory, scholars like
Freund would attempt to rationalize the body of American corporate
law. What would result, though, is an unstable body of case law
concerning the rights of the corporation as a legal person.

IV. A CORPORATE

CONSCIENCE?

From the early twentieth-century forward, the Supreme Court has
generally decided which constitutional rights a corporation enjoys on
the basis of the "historic function" of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.139 Guarantees deemed to be limited to the protection of
individuals, "purely personal" guarantees, have been denied to
corporations.140 Arguably the most controversial protections to be
afforded to corporations arise under the First Amendment. This section
briefly addresses the role that conceptions of corporate legal personality
have played in recent jurisprudence, arguing that in many respects the
current Court has returned to the Marshall Court's view of the
corporation as an artificial entity representing an aggregation of its
members' rights.
In Terrett v. Taylor, the Marshall Court held that the incorporation
of religious institutions is entirely consistent with the First Amendment
PLURALISM AND THE PERSONALITY OF THE STATE 89-122 (1977); Horwitz, supra note 130,

at 179-80.
137. ERNST FREUND, Prefaceto THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897).

138. Id.
139. See, e.g. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944) (privilege against selfincrimination cannot be invoked on behalf of a labor union).
140. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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guarantee of free exercise of religion.1 41 However, in recent decades the
Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the precise scope of
religious corporations' rights to free exercise of religion. In particular, in
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 142 the Court
considered whether it was constitutional for corporations owned by the
Mormon Church to require all employees to certify that they were
members of the Church in good standing. 143 Holding for the petitioner,
the Court reasoned that,
For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning
in large measure from participation in a larger religious
community. Such a community represents an ongoing
tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not
reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals...
Solicitude for a church's [policies] . . .reflects the idea
that furtherance of the autonomy of religious
organizations often furthers individual religious freedom
44
as well. 1
The Court noted that participation in a religious community-a
religious corporation-broadens the scope of religious liberty because
there is an expressive value to community membership that cannot be
achieved by the individual in isolation. But the Court went a step
further. Not only did individuals have a First Amendment right to
practice their religion by incorporating as a nonprofit entity, but that
entity also had the right to adopt policies consistent with its religious
foundations. 145 In this sense, the corporation itself has a right of free
exercise.
Far more contentious has been the extension of First Amendment

141. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90. Indeed, religious corporations have a
rich history that long predates the emergence of the business corporation, so their
protection under the First Amendment might not be altogether surprising. See, e.g., Henry
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE L. J. 835 (1980).
142. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
143. A number of people who had been dismissed from nonreligious jobs claimed that
the certification requirement constituted discrimination in violation of §703 of Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which provides, "[iut shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2014).
144. Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 341-42.
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rights to business corporations in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission146 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.. 147 In Citizens
United, the Court invalidated key provisions of the 2002 McCain
Feingold-Act, 148 which limited political communication by both nonprofit
and business corporations. The 5-4 majority opinion held that laws
restricting political speech were subject to the same test of
constitutionality regardless of whether they applied to individuals or
corporations: strict scrutiny. Under that test, the government must
prove that statutory restrictions on speech promote a compelling public
interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose. In
overturning provisions of the statute, the Court quoted a previous
decision and held that "[s]tate law grants corporations special
advantages-such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable
treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets. . . . It is
rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special
149
advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights."
The majority based its opinion in part on First National Bank v.
Bellotti, 150 a 1978 case in which the Court had invalidated a state
statute that barred corporations from making political contributions.
Looking to the history of the First Amendment, the Court found that
• . .a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. If the
speakers here were not corporations, no one would
suggest that the State could silence their proposed
speech. It is the type of speech indispensible to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true
because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether

146. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
147. 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
148. 2 U.S.C.S. §441b, invalidated by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
149. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351 (internal quotations omitted). Shortly after the
decision was handed down, President Obama took the unprecedented step of rebuking the
Court in his State of the Union, accusing it of "open[ing] the floodgates for special
interests - including foreign corporations - to spend without limit in our elections."
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
150. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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corporation, association, union, or individual. 15 1
The right of free speech stemmed not from the nature of the corporation
as a legal entity, but from the First Amendment itself.152
In a spirited concurrence in part and dissent in part, Justice
Stevens argued:
[Clorporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help
structure and facilitate the activities of human beings,
to be sure, and their "personhood" often serves as a
useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves
members of the 'We the People" by whom and for whom
1 53
our Constitution was established.
But for the majority, the metaphysics of corporate legal personality
were beside the point. What mattered was the historical purpose of the
First Amendment, and that purpose, according to the majority, was to
maximize the volume and variety of speech available to the general
54
public.
By contrast with Bellotti, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby the Court
situated the business corporation's First Amendment right to free
exercise in the nature of the corporation itself, rather than in the
historical purpose of the constitutional guarantee. In Hobby Lobby, a
sharply divided Court ruled that closely held business corporations
enjoy the same religious exemptions under the Religious Freedom
55
The RFRA
Restoration Act (RFRA) as do nonprofit corporations.
stipulates that the federal government "shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability" 156 unless the governmental action satisfies the
test of strict scrutiny.
At issue in Hobby Lobby was the constitutionality of regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services to
which some business owners objected on religious grounds. The
151. Id. at 776-77 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966)).
152. For further discussion, see Adam Winkler, CorporatePersonhoodand the Rights of
CorporateSpeech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 867 (2007).
153. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 446 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
154. Id. at 339-40.
155. See 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2014).
156. § 2000bb-l(a).
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regulations required the businesses to provide health insurance
coverage for contraceptives deemed by the business owners to be
abortifacients repugnant to their religious beliefs. The Court concluded
that closely held business corporations are "persons" within the
meaning of RFRA:
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by
human beings to achieve desired ends. An established
body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the
people (including shareholders, officers, and employees)
who are associated with a corporation in one way or
another. When rights, whether constitutional or
statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to
protect the rights of these people. For example,
extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations
protects the privacy interests of employees and others
associated with the company. Protecting corporations
from government seizure of their property without just
compensation protects all those who have a stake in the
corporations' financial well-being. And protecting the
free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby...
protects the religious liberty of the humans who own
and control those companies. 157
The reasoning here looks less like Belotti and Hale than it does
Chief Justice Marshall's dissent in Dandridge. At issue in the latter
case was precisely how a corporation, as a creature of law, manifests its
will. The Court had to decide whether the Board of Directors of the
Bank of the United States had accepted a bond posted by a branch
cashier pursuant to the charter and bylaws of the corporation. The
Board of Directors argued that it had never accepted the bond, noting
that no written record of such acceptance existed. The cashier
responded that no written record was needed under the bylaws of the
corporation. In a sense, the case turned on a basic question of evidence:
how does one prove the will of a corporation? In an opinion by Joseph
Story, the majority sided with the cashier, holding that no written
record of the Board's approval was needed because the charter of the
corporation included no such requirement.
But to Marshall, who found himself uncharacteristically on the
dissenting side of the decision, the subsequent testimony of the
members of the Board was not enough to prove the will of the
157. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751 at 2768.
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corporation. He explained,
The corporation being one entire impersonal entity,
distinct from the individuals who compose it, must be
endowed with a mode of action peculiar to itself, which
will always distinguish its transactions from those of its
members. This faculty must be exercised according to its
own nature.... Can such a being speak, or act otherwise
than in writing? Being destitute of the natural organs of
man, being distinct from all its members, can it
communicate its resolutions, or declare its will, without
the aid of some adequate substitute for those organs? If
the answer to this question must be in the negative,
what is that substitute? I can imagine no other than
writing. The will to be announced is the aggregate will.
The voice which utters it must be the aggregate voice.
Human organs belong only to individuals. The words
they utter are the words of individuals. These
individuals must speak collectively to speak corporately,
and must use a collective voice. They have no such voice,
and must communicate this collective will in some other
mode. That other mode, as it seems to me, must be by
writing.158
The corporation is an artificial person 159 animated by the will of its
members. Absent its members, the corporation has no discernable will
of its own. 16 0 This, according to Marshall, is why a writing could serve as
the only sufficient proof of the aggregate will of the shareholders. The
majority did not appear to disagree with Marshall's fundamental
conception of the corporation but rather with the proper way to "hear"
the aggregate voice of the shareholders.
In Hobby Lobby, we see a return to Marshall's vision of the
corporation as an artificial person representing the aggregate will of its
members. And if the case is any indication of the court's future
trajectory on the nature of corporate personality, Chief Justice
Marshall, so often on the winning side in his lifetime, may continue
winning the day long after his death. There are compelling reasons to
158. Dandridge, 25 U.S. at 91-92 (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 691 (referring to the corporation as an
"artificial person").
160. C.f. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2768 ("Corporations, separate and apart from the
human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all
(internal quotations omitted).")
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believe that Hobby Lobby has very limited applications to future cases.
The ruling was heavily qualified by two factors. First, the majority
emphasized the unique nature of Hobby Lobby as a closely held (rather
than publicly traded) corporation. Second, the net effect of the ruling for
female employees was zero, as they could receive the contraceptives in
question free of charge through an accommodation provided by the
Department of Health and Human Services.16 1 Whatever the long-term
implications of the ruling, Hobby Lobby underscores the centrality of the
Court's conception of corporate legal personality in weighing
constitutional claims.
CONCLUSION

In 1903 Frederic Maitland delivered an address at Newnham
College, Cambridge, titled Moral Personality and Legal Personality. Of
the contemporary debate over whether the corporation was a real or
fictitious entity, he remarked:
Much disinclined though [one] may be to allow the group
a real will of its own, just as really real as the will of a
man, still [one] has to admit that if n men united
themselves in an organized body, jurisprudence, unless
it wishes to pulverize the group, must see n + 1 persons.
And that for the mere lawyer should I think be
62
enough.1
However, for the contemporary American lawyer, Maitland's formula is
not enough. The question is not whether the corporation is a person or
not. Nor, for that matter, is the question whether the corporation is a
real person or artificial person. Rather, the question is whether the
corporation, as a legal person, enjoys the same rights as a natural
person. It is a problem that grows no less challenging as the federal
judiciary continues to grapple with the very real impact of "invisible,
intangible, and incorporeal" entities in political society.
The purpose of this article has not been to harmonize or rationalize
federal jurisprudence on the legal personality of the corporation. Nor
has it been to offer an integrated theory of the corporate form. Rather,
by re-examining the federal judiciary's approach to competing views of
corporate personality-particularly during the antebellum period-this

161. Id. at 2759-60.
162. FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,

MAITLAND 316 (1911).
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article has attempted to enrich our understanding of a complex and, at
times, inconsistent body of law and legal theory. A close reading of the
Marshall Court's jurisprudence reveals the enduring influence of
English law on the young nation. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall's views
of corporate personality probably shared more in common with Lord
Coke's than with Justice Wayne's. This fact underscores just how
significant the Court's Letson ruling was not only for the subsequent
development of the corporation in America, but for the reception of new
theories of the corporate form by the courts.

